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SYMPOSIUM
LAWYERING FOR GROUPS:
CIVIL RIGHTS, MASS TORTS, AND
EVERYTHING IN BETWEEN
FOREWORD
Howard M. Erichson* & Benjamin C. Zipursky**
This much is clear: to pursue legal rights effectively, similarly situated
persons often need collective legal representation. This applies in many
lawyering settings but perhaps especially in large multiplaintiff litigation.
For claimants, collective representation—whether by class action or by
various forms of nonclass collective lawyering—enhances efficiency,
multiplies leverage, and increases lawyers’ investment of time and
resources. It is no exaggeration to say that in many cases the economic
viability of plaintiffs’ claims depends upon collective lawyering.
A lawyer’s representation of similarly situated claimants may resemble,
in certain ways, a lawyer’s representation of a corporation or other entity.
Incorporation or other entity formation makes it possible for the
organization to pursue or defend its interests as a collective. When a lawyer
represents an organization, the lawyer’s duty runs to the entity itself, not to
its officers, employees, shareholders, or other individual constituents or
stakeholders.1 Similarly, to harness the power of collective representation,
a lawyer pursuing claims on behalf of multiple claimants must to some
extent treat those claims as a collective set of interests. The class action
device makes such collective representation explicit by the authorization of
representative litigation and the appointment of class counsel.2 But even in
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. We are grateful to the Stein Center
for Law and Ethics and the Fordham Law Review for sponsoring this Symposium. In
particular, we thank Stein Center Associate Director Sherri Levine and Professors Bruce
Green and Russell Pearce for all of their work and for their steadfast support of this project.
** James H. Quinn Professor and Associate Dean for Research, Fordham University School
of Law.
1. See MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.13(a) (2012) (“A lawyer employed or
retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents.”).
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4) (“Class counsel must fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note (2003
amendment) (“[T]he primary responsibility of class counsel, resulting from appointment as
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nonclass settings, attention to collective interests may be both appropriate
and inevitable. Lawyers may find that the best way to comply with their
duty to each client is to prioritize the interests of the group.3
But just as the interests of entity stakeholders sometimes diverge, so may
the interests of a group of similarly situated clients, even if those interests
are generally aligned. Although a civil rights attorney may purport to
represent the collective interests of a group, the preferences and values of
group members may point in different directions.4 A mass tort lawyer may
purport to represent the collective interests of users of a product, persons
exposed to an environmental contamination, or victims of tortious conduct,
but the interests of those claimants may line up in varying ways over the
course of the litigation and especially in the construction and allocation of a
settlement.5 Even in seemingly uniform contexts such as antitrust claims,
fault lines may divide group interests.6 Despite the fact that plaintiffs’
interests do not line up perfectly, collective representation offers sufficient
advantages that claimants often rationally prefer representation by lawyers
who represent other similarly situated claimants.7 In both the entity setting
and the multiple-claimant setting, lawyers largely pursue collective interests
even as they recognize potentially divergent interests among stakeholders.
There are important differences, however, between the entity lawyer and
the multiple plaintiffs’ lawyer. And within the multiplaintiff setting, there
are important differences between class and nonclass representation. The
formation of a corporation creates a legal entity with duties, rights, and the
capacity to sue or be sued. The entity possesses claims and liabilities that
flow from its rights and duties under substantive law. When a lawyer
represents a corporation in litigation, the lawyer advances claims or
defenses that the substantive law provides to the entity itself. When the
lawyer represents a group of claimants, by contrast, the claims belong to the
claimants, not to the group as a whole. Even though the claims are pursued
through collective lawyering, the claims do not belong to the collective. A
class counsel, is to represent the best interests of the class. The rule thus establishes the
obligation of class counsel, an obligation that may be different from the customary
obligations of counsel to individual clients. Appointment as class counsel means that the
primary obligation of counsel is to the class rather than to any individual members of it.”).
3. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client
Autonomy in Non-class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 529
(explaining duties to clients who have opted for collective representation: “The lawyer’s
duty of loyalty runs to each individual client, but in group representation, the lawyer fulfills
that duty of loyalty by focusing first and foremost on collective interests.”).
4. This was the point made most famously by Derrick Bell concerning school
desegregation litigation. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
5. See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 282 (2011).
6. See, e.g., Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(upholding certification of a nationwide settlement class action encompassing claimants
from states that allowed indirect purchaser claims as well as states that did not allow such
claims).
7. See Erichson, supra note 3, at 543–50.
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class action carries the distinctive feature that class representatives, with
appointed class counsel, are authorized to pursue claims on behalf of other
members of the class,8 but even in a class action, the claims belong to the
class members.9
Thus, while the entity analogy is helpful for thinking about collective
representation and especially class actions,10 it cannot explain fully the
relationship between a lawyer and a group of clients or class of represented
persons. It would be a mistake to think of group lawyering purely in entity
terms. Even as a lawyer advances clients’ interests on a collective basis, the
lawyer must remain cognizant of the individual interests being represented.
Thinking about out how to strike this balance—on the one hand, the
necessity of group lawyering, and on the other, the recognition of the
interests of individual group members—was the primary goal of the
Lawyering for Groups Symposium. Often, these issues are encountered and
contemplated within the confines of a particular substantive context—mass
torts, civil rights, securities, antitrust, consumer litigation, and so on. And
often, these issues are discussed as matters relating to particular procedural
forms—class actions, multidistrict litigation, aggregate settlements, and
others. By engaging issues of group lawyering across multiple substantive
and procedural contexts, the Symposium sought to bring new insights. We
are very grateful to all of the participants for making the event so
stimulating and for filling this issue of the Fordham Law Review with
thoughtful accounts of the problems encountered by lawyers who represent
groups in various settings.11 Needless to say, the questions of group
lawyering do not admit of neat solutions that will satisfy all; sometimes the
best that can be hoped for is clear-eyed recognition of the intractability of
certain problems and the unavoidability of tensions and choices.

8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (delineating the circumstances under which “[o]ne or more
members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members”).
9. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1443 (2010) (noting that class certification “leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties intact
and the rules of decision unchanged”).
10. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class As Party and Client, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 913 (1998).
11. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Adequately Representing Groups, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
3043 (2013); Kristen A. Carpenter & Eli Wald, Lawyering for Groups: The Case of
American Indian Tribal Attorneys, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3085 (2013); Samuel Issacharoff,
The Governance Problem in Aggregate Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3165 (2013);
Alexandra D. Lahav, The Political Justification for Group Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
3193 (2013); Troy A. McKenzie, “Helpless” Groups, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3213 (2013);
Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Mass Tort Plaintiffs’ Representation: Beyond the
Aggregate Settlement Rule, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3233 (2013).

